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IN THE SUPRE!'1E COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

INTERl'10UNTAIN SMELTING CORP.,:
and STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Plaintiffs on Appeal,
Case No.

-vs-

16530

INDUSTRIAL COM~ISSION OF UTAH,
ANTHONY CAPITANO, and SPECIAL:
FUND OF Section 35-l-69 Utah
Code Ann.,
Defendants on Appeal.

NATURE OF THE CASE
Defendants on Appeal accept statement of Plaintiffs on
Appeal in the Nature of the Case.
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COM11ISSION
Defendant on Aopeal, Industrial Commission, issued its Order
fur Compensation and Medical Expenses during temporary total
~isability

be paid by the employer.

Permanent partial compensa-

tion was apportioned.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants on Appeal respectfully ask the decision of the
I:cdustrial Co!11TI'ission be confirmed.
FACTS
This case is an excellent example of the need and benefit
c': a "soecial" or "second injury" fund,

if correctly used.

There '-'·as a previous "ince:pacity" to employee by reason of
~u~shct

1njur~

to his

le~t

foot while in the military.

He has
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~nd

is receiving benefits of $113 per month from the United

t:,

States Government which '.'.'ill continue during the remainder of

inj~

life based on a thirty percent "disability" rating for such

The employee then sustained an industrial accident to his right
foot which was rated by a medical panel as thirty percent loss
of the right foot, or eight and one-half percent loss of the
whole man.

The panel then gave a rating of twenty-five percent

loss of the whole man to which the administrative law judge
concluded as eight and one-half percent for each foot injury

pl~

eight percent loss because of the right foot injury "acting upo,_
the left foot injury to produce an additional loss over and abC"'
the loss sustained by each foot injury taken seperately, or as
stated by Larso:1's 1-lorkman's Compensation Law, Sec.

59.00:

"The

total effect of two successive injuries may be much greater t)-,a:
the sum of schedule allowances for the parts."

The Order in tL

case by the Industrial Commission awarded the employee compensa·
tion from the second injury fund for this "added upon" eight
percent increase.

See R-160 for excellent account by the admi,,_.

strative law judae on the method of arriving at the
of impairment by the medical panel.

cercenta~

The only question at

iss~

is the liability o'f' the Second Injur-y Fund for acportionment o'
cor1pensation and medical exoenses durino temporarv total disa::.
This case v,•as heard by the Industrial Commission after

:~.e

Ortega decision and befor-e the combined case of \·:hi te, etc \·:as
issued.
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Point I.
TEMPORARY TOTAL COMPENSATION AND
HEDICAL EXPENSES DURING TEMPORARY
TOTAL ARE NOT APPORTIONABLE.
The Industrial Commission is well aware of the Ortega and
White decisions and the stated position of apportioning temporary
total compensation and medical expenses during temporary total
disability.

The present case was heard before the White case

ruling upheld Ortega without comment,

even though the issue of

apportionment of temporary total and medical expenses during
temporary total disability was never at issue in Ortega.
The present case is typical of the complete

disruption of

long standing logical and workable orders of the Industrial
Comwission that have been put in confusion by the Ortega and
Hhite decisions.

There has been almost no judicial precedent on

the subject of apportioning compensation and medical expenses
during temporary total disability because the objections to such
apportionment are so apparent.

California has, however, under

almost identical circumstances, clearly enunciated why temporary
disability is not apportionable.
In view of the ambiguity of the statute,
the rule of liberal construction, the delays
which will necessarily result if temporary
disability is made apportionable, the resulting frustration of the legislative policy of
making te~porary disability substitute for
lost wages, and our public policy of expeditious
oayment, we conclude that temporary disability
is not apportionable. G~anado v. Workmen's
Compensation Appeals Board, 4~5P.2 294 at 299.
The rule of not apportionino temporary disability has always
~rel·ailed

in Utah until Orteaa.

And that same rule applies
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whether or not a prior disability increases compensation or TPec:.
expenses during tenporary disability.
The arguements against apportionment are especially meanbcful under the present facts of this case.

There is nothing in
ti~e

the record to indicate that either medical expenses or the

of temporary total disability was increased by the prior foot
injury that occured in military service.
There is no possible reason under the law of workmen's

co~

pensation for a second injury fund to be liabile for the expense:
incurred

by

an

industrial accident when those expenses were

not increased by a prior disability.

Even sec.

35-1-69 makes t'.·

employer liable "for the industrial injury onlv,"

and not for

just a part of the expenses of that industrial injury.
The commission detailed at considerable length in the l''hit:
brief how the Orteaa decision drastically chanced the applicaL
of the second injury fund.
inc; the judicial decision

went in changing the law in this sta:·

without a new legislative enactment.
of

~hat

rea~

This case illustrates how far

I ~ill give an illustrat~

Ortega could do in just the case of approtionment of

temporary total disability:
Employee breaks a leg in an industrial accident and

co~

plications exist wl-:ich cause the me~ical panel to cive hirr a::
percent permanent partial disability for the leg injury
months temporary total.

a~te!

He has a ten Percent prior disabiLt

because of arthrit~s in h~s shoulder.
hin fifteen percent permanent cart1al,

The ::a:-:el therefore c:"''
~lve

i=.er-ce;:t for ir.c_:::
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i~jury

and ten percent pre-existing.

Under Ortega the second

injury fund would pay 66 2/3 percent of all expenses during ternorary total even though none of the expenses were for other than
the industrial injury.
The facts of both the illustration and of this case clearly
demonstrate the unfairness of apportionment under Section 69 until
a determination of permanent incapacity is made.
Point II.
THE SECOND INJURY FUND IS NOT LIABLE
FOR A PRIOR INCAPACITY FOR WHICH THE
EMPLOYEE HAS RECEIVED COMPENSATION.
Double payment to an injured worker has not been approved
by this court or any court to our knowledge in workmen's compen-

sation cases.

Capitano is receiving $113 per month for the

military injury from the U.S. Government.

The general rule is

well stated in Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law:
It has always been accepted without question
that the situation to which the Second Injury Fund
applies consists of a prior noncompensable injury
followed by and combining with a subsequent compensable injury.
Sec. 59.32 page 10-316.
CONCLUSION
The Order of the Industrial Commission should be affirmed.
mhe general rule of not apportioning compensation or medical
expenses durinc teroporary total disability is valid and followed
~vall jurisdictions.

It would be indefensable to apportion under the facts of
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this case where all the medical expenses and compensation duri~
temporary disability were the result of the industrial accident.
DATED this

:/~day

of February, 1980.
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